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Texts, contexts, pretexts and science. 
 
 
Introduction. 
At a rough count, Pierre Bourdieu published about 40 books and 200 articles during 
his lifetime.  When he was alive he vigorously resisted allowing this work to be 
described as his intellectual corpus because this implied that it was dead and inert.  
Since January of 2002, of course, that situation has changed.  What is contained in 
those texts will increasingly constitute what ‘Bourdieu’ denotes, however much a folk 
memory will continue amongst those who worked closely with him and were affected 
by his personal dynamism.  Since social science ‘beyond Bourdieu’1 will necessarily 
have to be considered in terms of an interpretation of Bourdieu’s significance based 
on his texts without personal acquaintance, I want to focus on the following issues.  
How well do we need to be informed about the contexts of production of Bourdieu’s 
texts to be able to deploy his concepts?  How far can reference to Bourdieu’s texts 
constitute the pretext for our own researches?  In what ways do our understandings of 
Bourdieu’s works in their contexts or as pretexts for our research enable us to 
generate social science? 
 
I want to look at a few early texts in some detail to try to trace the early stages of 
Bourdieu’s own thinking on these questions. However, the questions raise 
philosophical issues concerning the nature and status of social scientific explanation 
in general which were of importance for Bourdieu from the beginning to the end of 
his career.  His philosophical reflections on social scientific theory and practice may 
well turn out to be his most significant legacy as social scientific enquiry  necessarily 
adjusts to the conditions of mass social democracy within states and, between states or 
globally, to the struggle after colonialism to acknowledge perspectival equality and 
                                       
1  This text is an amended version of a keynote address given to a conference on “Social Science 
Beyond Bourdieu” which took place at the University of East London, June 19-20, 2003. 
recognize cultural diversity.  I have recently argued elsewhere2 that, as a student at 
the Ecole Normale Supérieure in the early 1950s, leading up to his work for his 
diplôme d’études supérieures on Leibniz’s critique of Cartesian epistemology, 
Bourdieu was influenced by those French academic philosophers who were 
particularly interested in reconsidering the status of mathematics, either as an a prior
logical system or as an instrument for explaining the phenomenal realities of the 
external physical world.  This was the focus of the interest of Martial Guéroult in his 
Dynamique et Métaphysique Leibniziennes (1935) and of Jules Vuillemin in his
Physique et métaphysique Kantiennes  (1955). Bourdieu referred specifically to these 
precursors  and their discussions informed his early thinking about the relative 
explanatory status of quantitative and qualitative analyses in social science.  Whereas 
initially Bourdieu formulated the problem in terms of the parameters of utility for 
social understanding of statistical data or ethnographic case studies, in the last years 
of his life, following through personally his stated commitment to reflexivity, he 
became more specifically interested in the relationship between ‘subjective’ and 
‘objective’ analyses, seeking to identify the objective conditions of possibility of his
subjectively-based researches and hence to clarify the grounds for making a transiti
from particular enquiry to universal theory.  His late forays into what might appe
be autobiographical writing in parts of Méditations pascaliennes (Bourdieu, 1997) 
and parts of Science de la science et réflexivité (Bourdieu, 2001) as well as, notab
in the posthumous Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (Bourdieu, 2004) have all to
understood as attempts to explore the nature of the referentiality of social science.  
Social science texts do not represent the prior, objective realities of social relations, 
but nor are they expressive of the orientations of idiosyncratic, a-social individuals.  
They express the orientations of selves whose identities and intellectual perspectives 
are shaped by the phenomena which they seek to objectify.  Objective analysis of the 
grounds of one’s own subjectivity thereby becomes one analysis of objective 
conditions to be set alongside others within a community of partici
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As Bourdieu deliberately and playfully indicated at the front of Esquisse pour une 
auto-analyse:  “Ceci n’est pas une autobiographie” (‘This is not an autobiography’ – 
echoing Magritte’s famous picture:  ‘This is not a pipe’).  It was, rather, a form of 
2  In “Kant, Cassirer et Bourdieu” in J. Ferrari, M. Ruffing, R. Theis, & M. Vollet, eds., Kant et 
la France – Kant und Frankreich, collection “Europaea Memoria”, G. Olms-Verlag, 2005. 
self-analysis which was inseparable from the quest for objective science.  If we can 
suggest that this aspect of Bourdieu’s late work was an attempt to apply to himself 
and his work the conceptual framework which he had outlined in 1966 in “Champ 
intellectuel et projet créateur” (“Intellectual field and creative project”) (Bourdieu, 
1966, 1971) it is also the case that Bourdieu was always as interested, to use the terms 
he offered in “Symbolic Power” (Bourdieu, 1977a), in the ‘structured structure’ of 
texts as much as their ‘structuring structures’.  What kind of meaning is effected in 
social scientific writing by the importation of terms and concepts whose meanings are 
predefined in independent intellectual contexts?  This was an interest which clearly 
motivated the writing of “The Genesis of the Concepts of Habitus and Field” 
(Bourdieu, 1985) in respect of his own concepts and it relates to his earlier discussion 
of the use of analogy in social science in “Structuralism and Theory of Sociological 
Knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1968).  The evidence that this remained a live concern for 
Bourdieu is somewhat tangential, but real.  In 1999, Bourdieu published in his own 
Editions Raisons d’Agir a text produced by his fellow professor at the Collège de 
France – Jacques Bouveresse.  It was entitled:  Prodiges et vertiges de l’analogie 
(Bouveresse, 1999), and was based on two articles published in Cahiers rationalistes 
in 1998 in which Bouveresse analysed the ‘Sokal affair’ in which two physicists had 
passed off a text containing ‘scientific errors’ as a postmodern contribution to 
‘Cultural Studies’.  The pastiche was entitled:  “Transgressing the Boundaries:  
toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity”, published in 1996, and 
the authors, Sokal and Bricmont, followed it with an analysis of the deception, 
entitled Impostures intellectuelles (Sokal & Bricmont, 1999).  Bouveresse discusses 
their analysis and it is significant that, in an early footnote, he quotes a remark of Loic 
Wacquant, with whom Bourdieu was collaborating greatly at the time, to the effect 
that the ‘Sokal affair’  “would, in reality, be better called the Social Text affair”  
(Bouveresse, 1999, 8) – acknowledging, in other words that the deception raised 
important general questions about the provenance of scientific meaning in the 
language deployed in social science texts.  Bouveresse tries to hold to a middle 
position.  On the one hand, by way of example,  he subjects Régis Debray’s use of 
Gödel’s theorem in Le Scribe, genèse du politique (Debray, 1980) and Critique de la 
raison politique (Debray, 1981)) to rigorous scrutiny and argues that Gödel’s theorem 
pertains to ‘formal systems’ and demonstrates ‘absolutely nothing in relation to social 
systems’ (Bouveresse, 1999, 27).  On the other hand, Bouveresse refers to the 
discussions of Maxwell, Hertz, Boltzmann, Mach and others concerning the role of 
comparison and analogy in the sciences and acknowledges that there are metaphors 
which are “’constitutive of theory’, and not simply heuristic, pedagogical or 
exegetical.” (Bouveresee, 1999, 36).  If Debray’s deployment of Gödel’s theorem 
exemplified a false conceptual appropriation across discourses, Sokal and Bricmont’s 
pastiche was equally wrong in supposing that scientific understanding is only 
achievable and valid as the product of non-metaphorical reasoning. Bouveresse’s 
recommended solution is expressed in terms which would have appealed to Bourdieu, 
not least in its use of Wittgensteinian thoughts.  Three recommendations express 
sarcastically what postmodern philosophers should not do if they wish to appropriate 
scientific concepts: 
“1.  
Never especially look at the demonstration of the theorem, which would 
however be the best means of knowing whether what is demonstrated is valid.  
As Wittgenstein said: ‘if you want to know what a demonstration 
demonstrates, look at the demonstration’. … 
2.  
Do not read any of the numerous serious and informed (but, it is true, 
unfortunately themselves rather technical) commentaries which have been 
written on the kind of philosophical meaning that can or cannot be attributed 
to Gödel’s theorem. … 
3. 
Avoid as well looking at what Gödel himself said about the philosophical 
significance of his conclusion  and about the extensions to it which might be 
dreamt up.” (Bouveresse, 1999, 62-3). 
 
Postmodern discourse, in other words, may be, for Bouveresse,  a philosophical 
discourse sui generis, but the deployment of philosophical concepts so as to generate 
natural or social science requires the application of strict rules of conceptual transfer, 
involving rigorous thought rather than modish superficiality. 
 
The purpose of my examination of some of Bourdieu’s texts is to suggest that 
Bouveresse’s recommended solution – turned into positive injunctions - articulated 
the underlying assumption of Bourdieu’s practice on the boundaries between 
philosophy and science, and should also constitute the underlying assumption as we 
work with Bourdieu’s work. 
 
Bourdieu’s textual practice - I. 
 
 I will start with Sociologie de l’Algérie (Bourdieu, 1958) which was Bourdieu’s first 
published book, a short text of 128 pages published in the popular Que Sais-Je series 
of the Presses Universitaires de France in 1958. Bourdieu had been trained in 
philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in the early 1950s and had been 
conscripted for military service in Algeria in 1956.  He had received no specifically 
sociological training which might have indicated what it might mean to write ‘a 
sociology of Algeria’.  The opening sentence ran as follows (in the 1962 translation): 
  
“It is obvious that Algeria, when considered in isolation from the rest of the 
Maghreb, does not constitute a true cultural unit.  However, I have limited my 
investigation to Algeria for a definite reason.  Algeria is specifically the object 
of this study because the clash between the indigenous and the European 
civilizations has made itself felt here with the greatest force.  Thus the 
problem under investigation has determined the choice of subject.” (Bourdieu, 
1962, xi) 
 
From the very outset, therefore, Bourdieu was sure that he was not offering an 
account of an Algeria that was objectively there.  His account was not an attempt to 
represent a prior social reality on two counts.  Firstly, the diverse cultures of the North 
African geographical space were in the process, during the course of the War of 
Independence, of constituting themselves as an independent political entity.  Algeria 
was in the process of self-constitution or, in 1958, of still resisting an identity imposed 
by the French.  Secondly, the object of the enquiry for Bourdieu was not the static 
condition of Algeria but the processes of cultural adaptation within the geographical 
region whereby the indigenous inhabitants might gradually construct a self-
determined national identity.  The important thing for our purposes was that the text 
was not a representation of an existing reality. In relation to the Kabyles, for instance, 
Bourdieu’s main source for his account of tribal customs was an ethnographic study 
produced in 3 volumes in the 1870s by two colonial administrators3.  Bourdieu 
certainly observed the actual situation in rural areas since he took two thousand 
photographs, some of which were exhibited at the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris in 
January, 20034, and some of which have been included in a publication introduced by 
Franz Schultheis, entitled: Images d’Algérie.  Une affinité elective (Bourdieu, 2003).  
The fact of this photographic activity is significant.  The photographs provided a 
visual account of particular human situations.  Similarly, the text of Sociologie de 
l’Algérie was not an analysis of Algerian society in totality but a verbal description of 
particular tribal organizations.  It was a kind of fiction, working from dated secondary 
sources.  Nevertheless, in an importantly different sense for Bourdieu it was a 
representation.  It was not a representation that was tied down empirically by facts to 
be represented.  It was a representation of social conditions in Algeria which was 
designed to affect the mainland readership.  It was intended to be a politically 
affective and effective intervention in the debate occurring in France about the 
appropriate strategy in relation to Algerian independence, the relinquishing of the 
notion of Algérie Française.  It was designed to show that indigenous social 
organizations functioned adequately before the disenchantment of the world imposed 
by French colonialism and that the challenge for the French was to allow these 
indigenous strengths to reassert themselves in constituting an independent state.  
Bourdieu’s text was a representation which appeared in Paris at the same time as the 
Chroniques Algériennes of Albert Camus which were his re-issued reports of poverty 
and suffering amongst the Kabyles in the 1940s (Camus, 1958).  The political 
solutions proposed by Bourdieu and Camus were not the same, but the formal 
functions of their texts were not dissimilar. 
 
Bourdieu’s textual practice – II. 
 
Bourdieu’s next major text – Travail et travailleurs en Algérie (1963) – was very 
different.  It was a total of 567 pages, published in two parts – the first giving 
statistical data, authored by Alain Darbel, Jean-Paul Rivet, and Claude Seibel who 
were administrators at INSEE, the Institut National de Statistique et d’Etudes 
                                       
3  A. Hanoteau and A. Letourneau:  La Kabyle et les coutumes kabyles. 
4  and, subsequently, as part of the European Capital of culture Programme in Graz (14 
November, 2003 – February, 2004), and in London (14 October, 2004 – 28 November, 20040) at The 
Photographers’ Gallery as part of its season of exhibitions of views of the Mediterranean. 
Economiques, and the second part, authored by Bourdieu, called a sociological study.  
Bourdieu wrote an Introduction to the first part entitled “Statistics and Sociology” 
which I translated several years ago (Robbins, 1999) and I have also recently 
translated Bourdieu’s Foreword to the second part under the title of “Ethnography and 
colonialism”(Robbins, 2003), but I am very happy to say that there are now plans to 
publish the whole work in translation.  It was clearly the first time that Bourdieu had 
worked with statisticians.  His discussion of the relationship between Statistics and 
Sociology is a discussion of the necessary methodological reciprocity between  
statistical analysis based on large data sets and the use of ethnographic case-studies to 
expose particular cultural traits.  In other words, Bourdieu was now really coming to 
terms with how one might offer a sociology of Algeria in a way in which he had not 
in the book of that title.  His solution was to argue that statisticians were able to 
construct general social patterns which needed to be tested against the observed 
experiences of individuals, whilst ethnographic case-studies were, equally, necessary 
to check the validity of the bases of data construction developed by statisticians.  
What was involved was a process of methodological balancing, constantly 
juxtaposing the general and the particular.  There was a strong sense that Bourdieu 
believed that the objectivity of his account of Algeria this time could not be received 
as such, as the end product of research, but should only be received within a text 
which graphically documented its own procedures.  The account of the methodology 
adopted was an intrinsic part of the final text.  Bourdieu described in detail the 
problems encountered by the team of researchers – mainly Algerian – as they 
conducted their interviews and there were appendices in which the responses of those 
interviewed were published verbatim.  It was as if Bourdieu was seeking to present in 
writing an effect which was as near as possible to being a reconstruction of the 
process of the enquiry. (“If you want to know what a demonstration demonstrates, 
look at the demonstration”). He believed that the process of conducting the research 
was one which, for the researchers, was a process of political and social engagement 
rather than one of detached observation, and he sought to make the text a surrogate 
political action. 
 
 
 
 
Bourdieu’s textual practice – III. 
 
I want to make a few more brief points about some other Bourdieu texts before 
broadening the discussion.  First of all, I want to draw attention to the relationship 
between Les étudiants et leurs études (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964a) and Les Héritiers 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964b) and then the English translation which was published 
as The Inheritors 15 years later (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979).  The first of these texts 
was the first published Cahier of the Centre de Sociologie Européenne.  Its first 
sentence indicated that the Working Paper was presenting the results of two surveys 
carried out in several French universities in the academic years 1961-2 and 1962-3.  
The chapters of the Paper gave all the findings in tabular form with commentary 
whilst two appendices gave statistical information about the samples and reproduced 
the questionnaires which had been used.  There is only an eleven line general 
conclusion which begins by saying that this is not the place to develop all the practical 
and pedagogical consequences which follow from the findings and this sentence has a 
footnote which comments: 
“Concerned to condense the facts as precisely as possible and to represent 
their diversity and their nuances, we are committed here to a literal exposé so 
as to develop elsewhere, in a systematic manner, the context within which 
these results will acquire their full meaning.  (cf. P. Bourdieu & J.-C. 
Passeron.  Les Héritiers.  Essai sur les étudiants et la culture.)”(Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1964a, 123). 
The two French texts were published pretty much simultaneously in 1964 and each 
refers to the other.  It was not a case of the one being a revised version of the other so 
much as a conscious choice of dual modes of presentation.  Les Héritiers (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1964b)has a Foreword which gives precise details of the surveys on which 
the book’s argument is based and it offers a caution about generalising beyond the 
particular facts cited.  Similarly, there are two appendices, the first of which gives 
statistical information about students in France between 1900 and 1963, and the 
second of which provides “some documents and survey results”.  In the main text, 
some of the tables of the Working Paper are reproduced, but the argument of the book 
is framed within three chapters which, in the subsequent English translation, were 
called “Selecting the Elect”, “Games Students Play”, and “Sorcerers’ Apprentices”.  
The first of these was headed by a quotation from Margaret Mead’s Continuities in 
Cultural Evolution, the second with a quotation from Durkheim, and the third with a 
quotation from Hegel.  The second appendix did not simply offer the results of the 
surveys which had generated the presentation in Les étudiants et leurs études.  It also 
added findings from contemporary surveys of education in Poland and Hungary.  The 
translation which was published in the United States by the University of Chicago 
Press in 1979 (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979) faithfully followed the text of Les 
Héritiers, but there were some additions.  Bourdieu wrote a one-page Preface to the 
American Edition in which he offered a post hoc interpretation of the meaning of the 
text – a meaning which, I think, was only apparent to the authors after they had 
followed through their thinking to La Reproduction in 1970 (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1970).  The Inheritors additionally provided, as an Epilogue, an edited version of an 
article which Bourdieu had written in 1978 with the title:  “Classement, déclassement, 
reclassement”. (Bourdieu, 1978).  Pursuing this theme further, Bourdieu took the 
opportunity of the publication in 1990 of the second edition of La Reproduction (the 
first English edition of which had been published in 1977 as Reproduction in 
Education, Society and Culture [Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977]) to write a Preface 
entitled “Academic Order and Social Order”.  This was a short text, dated May, 1989, 
in which Bourdieu expressed pleasure that the product of his collaborative research 
with Passeron in the 1960s had stimulated a series of studies, both theoretical and 
empirical, in Great Britain and the United States which had endorsed the original 
work.  In the final sentences of the Preface, Bourdieu, typically, regarded this 
consequence both as a form of retrospective validation of the earlier science and as 
indicative of the susceptibility of different cultural traditions to respond to the 
deployment of common analytical instruments. This was the period in which 
Bourdieu was exploring the limits of the transcultural transferability of social science 
concepts in dialogue with American colleagues at Chicago and he concluded: 
“This empirical validation of the model outlined in Reproduction in the very 
society that was for so long held up as its living refutation would appear to be 
worth all the proofs and procedures of conventional empiricist methodology.  
And we shall not despair that America loses yet another parcel of its 
‘exceptionalism’ when this loss contributes to the greater unity of social 
science.” (Bourdieu, 1989, in Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, xi). 
 
The main thing I want to take from this commentary is that in his early work Bourdieu 
made a clear distinction between the logic of scientific discovery and the rhetoric of 
intellectual communication.  Simultaneously in Bourdieu’s work, there was a desire to 
legitimise the scientificity of his findings by meticulously representing the 
instruments which had generated those findings, whilst the representation of the 
scientificity was itself part of a rhetorical strategy to generalise more effectively, both  
philosophically and politically.  He was also experimenting with different strategies 
for generalising beyond particular facts.  In the same period, the text of L’Amour de 
l’art (Bourdieu, Darbel, & Schnapper, 1966), for instance, has five detailed statistical 
and operational appendices and a third part – the laws of cultural diffusion – which is 
heavily mathematical.  These procedures which seem to owe much to methods 
developed by Lazarsfeld co-exist with opening chapters in which findings are related 
to generalised thinking about art and art appreciation which seem to be derived from 
Bourdieu’s reading at the time of the work of Panofsky.  Again, in the same period, 
there is the famous mode of presentation adopted in La Reproduction (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1970) in which the second part is a discursive reflection on empirical 
findings whilst the first offers the ‘foundations of a theory of symbolic violence’ in a 
series of propositions and sub-propositions – adopting, that is, a propositional form of 
generalisation which, it has been suggested, derives from Spinoza. 
 
The context of Bourdieu’s textual practice. 
 
 
Whilst the empirical work on education, photography, and museums was going on in 
the 1960s, Bourdieu’s work on Algeria was on the backburner.  His reflection on that 
work was to surface in Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique in 1972 (Bourdieu, 
1972), but before that there seem to me to have been two important strands which 
need to be noted.  The first is the publication, in 1966, of “Champ intellectuel et projet 
créateur” (Bourdieu, 1966) with which we are very familiar as a result of its early 
publication in English in 1971 as “Intellectual field and creative project”(Bourdieu, 
1971).  The second is the publication, in 1968, of Le métier de sociologue, (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968)) which is perhaps better known in the 1991 
translation as The Craft of Sociology (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991).   
In the ‘Champ intellectuel’ article, Bourdieu considered the way in which the context 
in which a work is published is partially constitutive of the work itself, or, to put it 
differently, that artists internalise an anticipated reception of their work as a part of 
the process of production. Incidentally, Bourdieu was also arguing that the ways in 
which artists locate themselves immanently within a communicative field is different 
from the ways in which observers – contemporaries or subsequent academic critics - 
might seek to impose a structural conceptualisation of that relationship. It was 
significant that the article was about artists or creative writers although it was clear 
from the title that Bourdieu was willing to extend his point to apply to the production 
and reception of intellectual work.  There was, however, no explicit mention of 
whether or not intellectual work could be considered to include scientific work. The 
underlying assumption was that texts do not refer to any external or prior reality but 
are constituted within communicative systems which are themselves the results of 
social and historical production.  The influence of Bachelard which was only tacit 
here became explicit in Le métier de sociologue.  Subtitled ‘epistemological 
preliminaries’, the interest of this text is that it was intended to be the first of three 
which would act as handbooks for postgraduate students to assist in the preparation 
and conduct of empirical research.  It tried to argue that social science discourse had 
to be constructed against the prenotions that might be prevailing within society.  The 
ambivalence of Le métier de sociologue is that it seems to be trying to apply 
Bachelard at two levels.  On the one hand, following Bachelard, the construction of 
the field of social science is something which occurred contingently, both socially and 
historically.  On the other hand, within this constructed discourse, social science itself 
advances by applying Bachelard’s methodological formula that scientific facts have to 
be ‘won, constructed, and confirmed’.  Le métier de sociologue was anxious to  push 
an anti-positivist theory of science, non-prescriptively to provide materials by which 
researchers could practise their own ars inveniendi.  It had an agenda within the 
established field of social science, but it seems also apparent that there was an agenda 
which would involve the creative deconstruction and reconstruction of the field itself.  
Researchers were encouraged to reflect sociologically on their own practice within the 
constituted field of social science, but no explicit attention was paid to reflection on 
the contingency of that field.  Le métier de sociologue did not discuss at all the 
transmission of social science findings except in as much as transmission was part of 
the process whereby, within the field, findings are falsified or verified. 
 
As I see it, therefore, Bourdieu was working with a logic of discovery within the 
defining rules of social science and also with a rhetoric of transmission beyond the 
autonomous field of social science which might involve scepticism about the 
epistemological status of that science.  It is significant that at about this time he 
started his analysis of the work of Flaubert because he wanted to consider whether the 
accounts of society provided by Flaubert, or, later, Zola, in accordance with the ‘rules 
of art’ at the end of the 19th century, were more socially and politically potent than the 
accounts of society provided contemporaneously within the emerging discourse of 
social scientific explanation. 
 
In parenthesis, we have to remember (or perhaps, whether or not we have to 
remember is precisely the question I am asking) that the development of Bourdieu’s 
thinking  at this time was framed by the legacy of various responses to Husserl or 
various versions of phenomenology.  Sartre’s Qu-est-ce que la littérature? of 1948 
(Sartre, 1948) had differentiated between the ways in which poets and prose writers 
make use of words.  Poets, according to Sartre, use words materially without choosing 
between them on the basis of prior referential meaning.  By contrast, as Sartre put it: 
“The art of prose is employed in discourse;  its substance is by nature 
significative;  that is, the words are first of all not objects but designations for 
objects;  it is not first of all a matter of knowing whether they please or 
displease in themselves, but whether they correctly indicate a certain thing or a 
certain notion.” (Sartre, 1967, 11) 
Nevertheless, Sartre did not talk explicitly about science.  He may have been able to 
differentiate between the functions of language in Flaubert or Mallarmé, but he did 
not consider the relationship between the function of significative language in the 
work of Flaubert or Durkheim, for instance.  In the late 1960 and early 1970s, Pierre 
Macherey, as then an Althusserian, tried to develop a theory of literary production 
which argued that texts as it were announce themselves, state within themselves their 
truth claims5.  For him, it was the task of philosophy to adjudicate between these truth 
claims, to judge whether, for example, the work of Marx announced itself as political 
philosophy or political science.  Again, Lyotard published his Discours, Figure in 
                                       
5  See P. Macherey (1974), translated as P. Macherey (1978).  Note also that P. Macherey (1966) 
was a contribution to the same number of Les Temps Modernes, devoted to the ‘problems of 
structuralism’, as was Bourdieu (1966).  For a short discussion of Macherey and Bourdieu, see D.M. 
Robbins (2000, 47-51). 
1971 (Lyotard, 1971), which was the first stage in the thinking which was to lead to 
the argument of La Condition Postmoderne at the end of the decade (Lyotard, 1979).  
Autonomous figurative language has to be liberated from the oppression of 
significative discourse.  The nature of the scientific, explanatory use of language was 
an issue in the period.  Bourdieu differed from Sartre, Macherey, and Lyotard, but his 
response was a response to the problems which they were articulating.  The key 
common factor in the mediation of the philosophy of Husserl was Merleau-Ponty.  
We know of Bourdieu’s acknowledgement of the influence of Merleau-Ponty’s early 
work – La Phénoménologie de la perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) and La structure 
du comportement (Merleau-Ponty, 1942) – and its significance for Bourdieu’s 
development of the notions of habitus and hexis, but I want to focus on Merleau-
Ponty’s last text, published posthumously in 1962, as L’Oeil et l’Esprit (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962b).  This essay focuses on the work of Cézanne and recommends the 
primacy of visual perception as a form of bodily knowing of the world.  Importantly, 
there is a section of the essay in which Merleau-Ponty analyses the attitude towards 
vision contained in the Dioptrics of Descartes.  This discussion becomes an overt 
attack on the way in which the development of Western science has been predicated 
on the Cartesian mind/body dualism.  According to Merleau-Ponty, Descartes only 
talked about painting en passant.  It was not, for him, ‘a central operation which 
contributes to defining our access to being’  but simply ‘ a mode or a variant of 
thought canonically defined by intellectual possession and evidence’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962b, 42).  If Descartes had appreciated colour he would have been confronted by 
the possibility of ‘openness to things without concept’. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962b, 43) 
 
I have no evidence that Bourdieu read this specific text of Merleau-Ponty, but the drift 
of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking was becoming clear in the last few years of his life and 
Bourdieu would undoubtedly have been aware of this drift.  It was not just that 
habitus and hexis were useful concepts for understanding human behaviour 
scientifically.  It was much more that habitus and hexis were ways of advocating a 
form of integration of rationality and experience which was superior to the humanly 
unsatisfactory post-Cartesian divorce of scientific reason from the processes of 
biological adaptation.  This was the kind of thinking which led towards Bourdieu’s 
articulation of “The three forms of theoretical knowledge” in 1973 (Bourdieu, 1973); 
to the position outlined in “Symbolic Power” (Bourdieu, 1977a) which was a paper 
that had been given in 1973; and also to “The specificity of the scientific field and the 
social conditions of the progress of reason” (Bourdieu, 1975).  It wasn’t that Bourdieu 
was opposing structuralism as a theoretical position within social science but much 
more that he was opposing the assumption that structuralist objectivity should be 
thought to be synonymous with science.  As we know from Bourdieu’s much later 
acknowledgement of his affinity with Pascal, he was taking Pascal’s view that ‘the 
heart has its reasons of which reason is unaware’ and opposing the assumption that 
scientific rationality defines the limits of knowledge. 
 
To summarise what I am saying so far.  We know that Bourdieu’s initial orientation 
was philosophical – to undertake an empirical investigation of the phenomenology of 
affective life.  The problem in Algeria was to think through how it becomes possible 
to write an account of the affective lives of others.  He generated an instrumental 
method of seeking to let the phenomena speak for themselves through his texts but, 
equally, he sought to transmit these texts within fields of intellectual reception.  We 
know from Bourdieu’s later articulation of a reflexive methodology, involving 
conscious ‘epistemological breaks’, that he was as dissatisfied with an 
ethnomethodological approach which might suppose that phenomena could absolutely 
speak for themselves as he was with the detachment of structuralist objectivity.  As a 
method of enquiry, Bourdieu’s ‘post-structuralism’ sought to integrate both 
aspirations, but it was also always the case that he saw his texts as products generated 
within a system of communication where meaning is constructed reciprocally in the 
way in which he had outlined in “Champ intellectuel et projet créateur” (Bourdieu, 
1966).  The situation of the Algerian fieldwork enabled Bourdieu to work for a while 
with an assumed separation of the Algerian field of observable phenomena from the 
field of French reception.  On returning to France, this methodological position based 
on geographical accident was no longer sustainable.  Initially, he felt the need to 
institutionalise a field of observational detachment in France which would seem to 
provide him within France with a functioning spatial detachment which was 
equivalent to the detachment of the colonial anthropologist.  Hence the endeavour of 
the 1960s, culminating in Le métier de sociologue,  to consolidate the rules and 
procedures of discrete sociological enquiry.  Social science advances by constructing 
hypotheses, often deploying concepts derived analoguously from other discourses, 
and these hypotheses are tested within a community sharing a common discourse.  
However, I think it became clear to Bourdieu that this functional separation of social 
science discourse was potentially a recipe for intellectual sterility and a recipe for the 
cultivation of a social elite of social science observers.  By the mid-1970s, Bourdieu 
was reflecting on the relations between prophets and priests and, in his work on 
fashion and Manet, exploring the ways in which both had used their initiation into 
consecrated practices to give credence to their expressions of contact with wider 
populations.  In the case of fashion, Bourdieu felt an affinity with Courrèges, a fellow 
Gascon who ‘tapped’ into an incipient demand for fashion clothing that responded to 
the needs of increasingly sexually emancipated women.  In short, the foundation was 
laid for the rest of Bourdieu’s career in which he sought to understand and deploy 
intellectual discourses not as ends in themselves but as means to tapping into what 
might be called a ‘social ontology’. 
 
Responding to Bourdieu’s texts. 
 
How does all of this affect the ways in which we should respond to Bourdieu’s texts 
or deploy them for our own purposes?  How does Bourdieu’s conception of his own 
activity relate to the ways in which we should contemplate a future for social science 
beyond Bourdieu? 
 
The first thing to say is, of course, that I have approached these questions by 
attempting to offer an interpretation of some of Bourdieu’s texts and their contexts.  
You may say that I am simply acquiescing in the way in which Bourdieu wanted to be 
read.  My contention here would be that the way in which he wanted to be read was 
inseparable from what he was trying to say and from the way in which he managed 
his career and conceptualised his career trajectory.  You might argue that this is still 
accepting his self-presentation and that what we need is criticism of Bourdieu which 
objectively evaluates his achievement.  The problem is to know what might constitute 
the criteria for such an objective evaluation.  Richard Jenkins attempted a critical 
evaluation which was also sympathetic but, in Bourdieu’s terms, this was an 
evaluation within the discourse of Sociology which failed to accept the extent to 
which Bourdieu was questioning the norms of social science.  Bourdieu genuinely 
could not understand how someone could spend time in writing a book on someone in 
order to expose the shortcomings of that person’s endeavour.  That is to say that 
Bourdieu assumed that any engagement with the work of another author was a form 
of inter-personal engagement, involving an elective affinity.  Responses to texts had 
to be the responses of persons to persons and he had little interest in ‘critiquing’ the 
positions of others by reference to supposed meta-criteria of validity.  This is why 
Bourdieu himself did not spend much time in criticising the intellectual positions held 
by his contemporaries.  There was a sense in which he recognized the logic of the 
production of Derrida or Deleuze or Lyotard or Foucault without finding it possible or 
desirable to reach any absolute judgement of the value of what they said.  As we 
know from Homo academicus (Bourdieu, 1984), their intellectual positions were 
understandable for Bourdieu predominantly in terms of their social trajectories, just as 
his own opinions or theories had to be understood reflexively in relation to his career. 
 
What I am suggesting, therefore, is best expressed through the distinction which 
Bourdieu made himself in “On Symbolic Power” between ‘structuring structures’ and 
‘structured structures’.  In order to respond adequately to a Bourdieu text, we have to 
see it as the outcome of a process of construction whereby Bourdieu reconciled the 
creative project which was the consequence of his habitus with the predispositions of 
the anticipated field of reception.  It was the need to see his texts as ‘structuring 
structures’ which caused him to write with some exasperation in his postscript to 
Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives  (Calhoun, LiPuma, & Postone, 1993) that he 
advocated ‘a socio-genetic understanding of intellectual works’.  This means that we 
are bound to recognize two kinds of context in responding to his texts – the context 
relating to the point of the text in his career trajectory from the Béarn to professor at 
the Collège de France, and the context of the historical situation of the field of 
reception within which the text was inserted.  Here we also have to remember that 
Bourdieu cumulatively constructed the field within which his works were received, 
and, perhaps more importantly, we have to realise that, steeped as he was in 
phenomenology, Bourdieu took the view that an understanding of these contextual 
fields – of production and reception – said as much about social phenomena as the 
accounts of reality ostensibly contained within the texts.  Nevertheless, Bourdieu did 
also recognize that texts require scutiny in their own terms or, perhaps, by reference to 
the rules governing their existence.  He recognized that what he called here a 
‘tautegorical’ reading of texts was necessary if the consideration of texts was not to 
collapse into social process as he thought had been the case with crude Marxist 
reductive analyses of thought and literature. 
 
I submit that Bourdieu’s position would have been that we have to respond to his texts 
reflexively.  We have to consider his texts both tautegorically and contextually and 
this should involve us in specifying the rules of the objective discipline within which 
we are seeking to make an evaluation of his work as well as specifying the social 
ontological roots of his and our deployment of that discipline in seeking to 
comprehend life experiences.  I haven’t said anything yet about pretexts.  By this I 
mean the use of Bourdieu’s texts as spring-boards for our own research.  I think it 
follows from what I have been saying that the crucial basis of distinguishing between 
legitimate and illegitimate pretextual practices is whether or not texts are used with or 
without the kind of contextual sensitivity that I have been outlining.  I want to give 
three brief examples of pretextual practice.  These are just examples and I am not 
wanting to censure individuals.  In referring to these examples of pretextual practice, 
in other words, it is important to adopt the procedure followed by Bourdieu himself in 
the first edition of Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1984) where he sought to represent 
the positions of individuals within the field of intellectual production without naming 
names, so as to acknowledge explicitly the dominant effects of the contexts within 
which individuals work and the external constraints on their communicated meanings.  
I refer to individuals only to particularise those ‘types’ or categories of response to 
Bourdieu which I seek to identify. 
 
Academic exploitation. 
 
Firstly, I read recently Ambivalent Europeans.  Ritual, Memory and the Public Sphere 
in Malta, by Jon Mitchell (Mitchell, 2002).  As the title suggests, the book writes up 
social anthropological research carried out in Malta which focused on the 
ambivalence between an indigenous cultural identity reinforced by traditional rituals 
associated with feasts in commemoration of St. Paul and a potential political identity 
defined by membership of the European Union. The Preface indicates that the 
published text was the culmination of a long period of research and thinking which 
had commenced in 1992.  It acknowledges ESRC funding and indebtedness to 
supervisors at the University of Edinburgh as well as to colleagues at that university 
and at University College, London and the University of Sussex.  It is the product of 
fieldwork in Malta, most of which was conducted in the Maltese language, and of 
engagement with the field of transmission and reception of British academic social 
anthropology. Chapter 8 is devoted to St. Paul’s festa which takes place every year in 
Valletta on February 10th.  The chapter begins with a general account of the 
significance of the festa for participants:  
“The effectiveness of the memories produced during festa derived from their 
polyvalence – their invocation of the national, the local, the familial and the 
gendered.” (Mitchell, 2002, 212) 
This is followed by a short case-study of one participant, based on fieldwork 
conversation which took place after the main festa procession in 1993.  This 
participant, aged 26, had recently returned to Malta after living for five years in 
Australia.  Mitchell elaborates on some of the participant’s comments to conclude 
that: 
“He therefore saw his engagement with the statue as a form of home-coming” 
(Mitchell, 2002, 214) 
This section of ethnography and interpretation is immediately followed by a section 
which is sub-titled;  “Ritual, artefact, experience”.  Mitchell briefly outlines the 
position on ritual advanced in Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life and by Turner in The Forest of Symbols: aspects of Ndembu ritual (1967) and 
The Ritual Process:  structure and anti-structure (1969).   He comments: 
“Both assume that at the centre of religion – or even society as a whole – lies a 
series of intense emotional experiences gained during important rituals, but 
neither manage to explain how these experiences work.” (Mitchell, 2002, 216) 
Remedying this shortcoming so as to locate explanations in ‘theories of memory and 
embodiment’ is, for Mitchell, crucial to reaching an understanding of the function of 
the festa in Malta in the early 1990s.  A ‘Durkheimian, totemic reading of Maltese 
festa’ is inadequate because it limits the function of the patron saint to representation 
of the collectivity whereas the kind of theory developed by Miller in Material Culture 
and Mass Consumption (1987) and elsewhere allows for the recognition of a process 
described as ‘the introjection of a projection’.  Miller’s text contains a detailed 
discussion of Bourdieu’s Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) and Mitchell summarises 
Miller’s contribution to theory – producing ‘a theory of culture that amounts also to a 
theory of praxis’ – in terms which recollect and are sympathetic to the achievement of 
Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu, 1977), proceeding also to refer 
to Miller’s analysis of the “’framing’ mechanisms by which objects become set aside 
as special” (which, again, Bourdieu explored in detail in “Piété religieuse et dévotion 
artistique.  Fidèles et amateurs d’art à Santa Maria Novella” (Bourdieu, 1994).  
However, it becomes clear that Mitchell’s orientation is to construct a generalisable 
theory.  Having deployed the notion of ‘framing’ to explain the physical engagement 
of participants with the embodiment of the saint in the festa, Mitchell moves straight 
into the following paragraph: 
 
Physical engagement with objects is central not only to the ritual process, but 
also learning more generally.  Alongside the experience of special objects that 
are set aside or framed, goes the more everyday, mundane engagement with 
the world around us that for Piaget is central to the learning process (1977).  
Piaget focuses on childhood learning, but there is evidence that this spatio-
visual cognition persists beyond childhood, remaining central to human 
sociality or ‘culture’ (Arnheim 1986, Bourdieu 1990, Csordas 1994, Mitchell 
1997, Toren 1990).  This is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in 
Bourdieu’s celebrated example of the Kabyle house (1990: 271-283), that is 
not only a concrete manifestation of a particular conceptual framework, but 
also the means by which that framework is learned.” (Mitchell, 2002, 217-8) 
 
The focus of Mitchell’s attention has suddenly shifted away from an attempted 
exposition of particular Maltese practice towards a deduction of the general 
characteristics of human behaviour.  The work of some authorities  (such as Piaget) is 
de-historicised and deployed to suggest an universal, theoretical truth.  Crucially, the 
work of Bourdieu is de-historicised.  Bourdieu’s ‘celebrated example’ of the Kabyle 
house was published originally in 1970 in a collection of articles offered to Lévi-
Strauss on the occasion of his 60th birthday.  Bourdieu reproduced it in the first part of 
Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (1972) as one of three ethnological studies 
which he wished methodologically to transcend.  The article was one which Bourdieu 
was particularly fond of using to indicate the way in which his subsequent post-
structuralist analyses superseded, without negating, those early structuralist exercises 
which had been written under the influence of Lévi-Strauss.  Bourdieu realised that 
“La maison kabyle ou le monde renversé” privileged the academic gaze of the 
anthropologist and unwittingly subordinated indigenous experience to the intellectual 
preoccupations of Western European intellectual discourse.  Mitchell cites Bourdieu’s 
further reproduction of the article in Le sens pratique (Bourdieu, 1980), translated as 
The Logic of Practice (1990) – a text which elaborates Bourdieu’s contention that 
anthropologists should observe practices and only reflexively generate theories – but 
he uses Bourdieu in such a way and with such company as to re-appropriate 
Bourdieu’s post-structuralism for a new kind of structuralist purpose, one in which 
pedagogical research and ethnographic observation are synthesized theoretically.  
Although Mitchell appreciates Bourdieu’s observation of the integration of subjective 
experience and objective structure and recognises the affinity between this 
observation and Miller’s notion of the introjection of a projection, nevertheless he 
does not appear to be as sensitive to Bourdieu’s awareness of the institutionalised 
ethnocentricity of much university anthropology.  Bourdieu’s rejection of the 
undeconstructed version of the Kabyle house article was the prelude to his analysis of 
the perspective of western intellectuals which was most clearly expressed in Homo 
Academicus (1984).  The coherence of Bourdieu’s work derived from the fact that he 
never allowed himself to think that his own practices were formally anything other 
than those he observed.  Bourdieu’s anthropological, sociological or cultural analyses 
became increasingly inseparable from his analyses of the social or institutional 
contexts in which they were generated.  To ignore this is to expose Bourdieu’s work 
to a slow death by academic exploitation. 
 
Nominal appropriation. 
 
My second example is a notorious one.  In a long footnote to the chapter on ‘Social 
Capital’ in Robert Putnam’s Making democracy work:  civic traditions in modern 
Italy (1993), he gave details of the provenance of the concept – acknowledging in 
particular the work of J.S. Coleman and his  Foundations of social theory (1980).  
This is not the place to try to go into detail about the way in which the concept of 
‘social capital’ has been taken up by social theorists in the Anglo-Saxon world as if 
Putnam and Coleman were using the term in the same way as Bourdieu had in the 
article called “le capital social:  notes provisoires” which he wrote for a whole number 
of Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales devoted to ‘le capital social’ in 1980 
(Bourdieu, 1980).  Equally, I have seen no attempt to clarify in detail the emergence 
of Bourdieu’s concept of social capital as a development from the concept of ‘cultural 
capital’ which he had advanced in 1964 in opposition to Gary Becker’s Human 
capital.  Bourdieu and James Coleman co-edited a book entitled Social Theory for a 
Changing Society following a conference in Chicago in 1989 (Bourdieu & Coleman, 
1991), but I have seen no discussions of ‘social capital’ which recognize that Coleman 
was talking about a social process pertaining to what he called a ‘constructed social 
organization’ and that, for him, Bourdieu’s social theory erroneously tried to apply 
concepts appropriate to ‘primordial and spontaneous social organization’.  In other 
words, there is a major debate to be had about the deployment of the concept of 
‘cultural capital’ and about the competing  theories of society or ideologies which 
underlie the competition.  Contextual analysis would indicate the legitimacy of the 
cross-cultural transfer of the concept, but there has been pretextual abuse in that the 
concept has been used instrumentally without any determined attempt to identify the 
different significances of the different contexts of conceptual development.  One 
might call this an instance of nominal appropriation or, indeed, what Bourdieu would 
have described as ‘symbolic violence’. 
 
Informed divergence. 
 
My third example is the text of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello:  Le nouvel esprit du 
capitalisme, published in 1999.  Boltanski worked closely with Bourdieu in the mid-
1970s, particularly on the research project on Le Patronat and his book entitled Les 
cadres.  La formation d’un groupe social  (Boltanski, 1982) acknowledged the 
influence of Bourdieu and was clearly the product of shared thinking with Bourdieu in 
the 1970s.  Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme is explicit in its indebtedness to Albert 
Hirschman and one element of the analysis is a section in which Boltanski discusses 
the work of Bourdieu, Derrida, and Deleuze as products of ‘’68 thought’.  Part 4 (‘La 
neutralisation de la critique de l’inauthenticité et ses effets perturbants’ – ‘the 
neutralisation of the inauthenticity critique and its disturbing effects’) of Chapter 7 
(‘A l’épreuve de la critique artiste’ – ‘putting the artistic critique to the test’) specifies 
that it is one of the principle arguments of the whole book that ‘le redéploiement du 
capitalisme a été associé à la récuperation de la figure du réseau’ (‘the revival of 
capitalism has been associated with the recovery of the notion of the network’) 
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999, 547).  The work of Bourdieu is briefly considered in 
the main text and in three detailed footnotes in as much as he was historically 
involved in opposing Sartrean notions of authenticity.  This denunciation of an 
existentialist view of personal identity in favour of an understanding that identities are 
constructed within systems of relational exchange contributed to the development of 
the new, non-puritanical, spirit of capitalism which is reliant on hedonistic play and 
the commodification of values.  To put this crudely in an explicit manner not used by 
Boltanski and Chiapello, Bourdieu’s deployment of the terminology of economics in, 
for instance, “Le marché des biens symboliques” (Bourdieu, 1971) backfired in that 
his analytical language helped to engender what it labelled in a way in which 
Bourdieu could not reverse in his late attempts, particularly in Les structures sociales 
de l’économie (Bourdieu, 2000), to resurrect the pre-eminence of the social over the 
economic. 
 
 In other words, Boltanski and Chiapello were prepared to develop what they took 
from Bourdieu’s thinking and apply it to social phenomena which, in their view, were 
in part the consequences of the social theory advanced by Bourdieu and others at a 
particular historical moment under specific social conditions.  In no sense are 
Boltanski and Chiapello working with disembodied concepts derived from Bourdieu’s 
work.  They have developed an understanding of the signficance of Bourdieu’s work 
and have accepted that Bourdieu’s analyses were partly responsible for constituting 
the new phenomena to be analysed.  I am not here discussing the pros and cons of 
their deviation from Bourdieu’s position, but I am recommending the nature of their 
style of response. It is a response, applied to Bourdieu, which owes much to 
Bourdieu’s thinking in that it takes for granted that social science and social theories 
are socio-historically situated.  It is a response which Bourdieu might readily have 
accepted intellectually and methodologically although, of course, the substance of the 
argument advanced by Boltanski and Chiapello was a form of political subversion 
which was understandably unpalatable. The pretextual methodology could be 
described as one of informed and engaged divergence.   
 
 
Conclusion. 
 
In preparing the conference held in memory of Bourdieu at the University of East 
London in June, 2003, the organising team was unsure whether it should be called 
“Social Science Beyond Bourdieu” or “Social Science After Bourdieu”.  I am not sure 
about the nuances, whether or not one implies more than the other the sense that his 
work is simply ended or passé.  I would defend the former title which we adopted by 
suggesting that it invites the reaction to Bourdieu’s work that he recommended in 
relation to structuralism.  He always insisted that it was not possible to negate 
structuralism but, instead, to use the insights to be derived from structuralism to go 
beyond it, to supersede it.  For Bourdieu, conceptual progress advanced not by thesis 
and antithesis but by gradual assimilation and reform, the gradual incorporation of 
ideas which had gone before.  Bourdieu’s work, the body of his texts, are parts of our 
intellectual landscape.  My personal view is that Bourdieu’s work strived to go 
beyond social science, to touch on ethical issues and questions of cultural difference 
and identity which transcend the concerns of the system world of state governments 
and bureaucracies.  He sought to infiltrate that system world in order to generate a 
kind of sociology which might function as an emancipatory conceptual apparatus for 
all inhabitants of the life-world.  Attempts to appropriate his texts for social science 
which pay no attention to his radical scepticism about  the professionalisation of 
social science are in danger of reinforcing the kind of social control that he fought 
against.  His last course of lectures at the Collège de France were published before his 
death as Science de la science et réflexivité (Bourdieu, 2001).  Typically, the lectures 
contained a passionate restatement of his commitment to scientific rigour and then 
moved into passages of autobiographical reflection.  There was no contradiction 
because he simply presented himself as an individual for whom rational enquiry was 
paradigmatically an expression of social being.  We can generate a social science 
which may account for all of our situations within mass democracy better than the 
institutionalised social science which we have inherited from the 19th Century.  We 
can do this by responding to Bourdieu’s texts as bi-products of his social trajectory, 
integral parts of his contexts.  His texts have now become our pretexts.  We should 
use them reflexively to restructure our social world to meet our needs. 
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Abstract. 
 
The paper focuses on the fact that the consequence of Bourdieu’s death is that we now 
have to respond specifically to the texts which he produced between 1958 and 2002 
rather than to the impact of  writing and political action in combination which was his 
goal during his life.  By reference to Bouveresse’s Prodiges et vertiges de l’analogie 
(1999), it raises general questions about the status of social texts in relation to the 
practices of philosophy and social scientific enquiry to which Bourdieu must have 
returned in preparing his final course of lectures, published in 2001 as Science de la 
science et réflexivité. It then proceeds to offer three case-studies of this relationship in 
action in Bourdieu’s early work, considering his textual and scientific practices.  It 
discusses aspects of the contemporary philosophical debate about the referentiality of 
texts at the time of this early work and thus indicates that this was an issue of 
continuous importance in Bourdieu’s work.  The paper next reflects on the 
significance of Bourdieu’s thinking in this respect for the ways in which we should 
now respond to his texts and deploy his concepts empirically.  It takes three examples 
of different ways in which Bourdieu’s texts have become pretexts for further research 
practice. These are characterised as ‘academic exploitation’, ‘nominal appropriation’, 
and ‘informed divergence’.  The conclusion is that Bourdieu’s work demands a 
reflexive response which requires that respondents should analyse rigorously their 
own situations and the grounds for transferring received concepts and that this entails 
detailed attention to both Bourdieu’s texts and the contexts of their production rather 
than a superficial exploitation or appropriation of his ‘consecrated’ texts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
